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Abstract
We propose a new capacity-achieving code for the private information retrieval (PIR) prob-
lem, and show that it has the minimum message size (being one less than the number of servers)
and the minimum upload cost (being roughly linear in the number of messages) among a general
class of capacity-achieving codes, and in particular, among all capacity-achieving linear codes.
Different from existing code constructions, the proposed code is asymmetric, and this asymme-
try appears to be the key factor leading to the optimal message size and the optimal upload
cost. The converse results on the message size and the upload cost are obtained by an analysis
of the information theoretic proof of the PIR capacity, from which a set of critical properties of
any capacity-achieving code in the code class of interest is extracted. The symmetry structure
of the PIR problem is then analyzed, which allows us to construct symmetric codes from asym-
metric ones, yielding a meaningful bridge between the proposed code and existing ones in the
literature.
1 Introduction
The private information retrieval (PIR) problem addresses the following scenario. A total of K
messages, each of L bits (or L symbols in some finite alphabet), are replicated at N servers. A
user wishes to retrieve one of the messages without revealing the identity of the desired message
to any individual server. To retrieve this message, the user generates one query for each server
and each server will return an answer to the user, which depends on the stored messages and the
received query. To ensure that each server learns nothing about which message is being retrieved in
the information theoretic sense, each query must be marginally independent of the desired message
index. The PIR problem admits a trivial solution, where the user simply requests all the messages.
However, downloading everything obviously incurs too much communication cost, and PIR systems
should be designed to communicate as efficiently as possible between the user and the servers.
In PIR systems, the most important measure of communication efficiency is the retrieval rate,
defined as the number of message information bits that can be retrieved per bit of downloaded data
from the servers. The maximum value of retrieval rate of a PIR system is referred to as its capacity,
and the problem of characterizing the capacity is of fundamental importance in this setting. This
problem was recently settled in [1] where the capacity was found to be
C =
(
1 +
1
N
+
1
N2
+ . . .+
1
NK−1
)−1
. (1)
Other notable efforts and generalizations on the PIR problem in the coding and information theory
literature can be found in, e.g., [2–22].
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In the previous works where the PIR capacity is concerned, such as [1, 2, 12, 14, 16–18], it is
usually assumed that the message length L is sufficiently large (L is allowed to go to infinity). As a
consequence, the corresponding code constructions in the literature are usually built by recursively
layering message symbols and parity symbols using symmetry relations, resulting in codes that can
only be applied on very long messages. The number of symbols in each message that a code can be
applied on is sometimes referred to as the sub-packetization factor of the code. A smaller message
length (sub-packetization factor) means that the code is more versatile, has less constraints, and
may lead to more efficient implementation in practice. Another design factor that is of practical
importance is the possible number of queries that each server needs to accommodate, i.e., the
cardinalities of the query sets. Small cardinalities of the query sets imply that, firstly, the amount
of information that needs to be sent to the servers (often referred to as the upload cost) is small
during the query operation, and secondly, the servers only need to compute a small set of functions,
both of which lead to simpler and more efficient system implementation.
In this work, we consider the construction of capacity-achieving PIR codes, and the contribution
of this work is three-fold.
1. Firstly, we propose a novel capacity-achieving PIR code construction, which has a small
message size of (N − 1) bits and a low upload cost of N(K − 1) log2N bits. The coding
alphabet of the proposed code can in fact be chosen to be any finite group or finite field,
and particularly, to be the binary field which results in a binary linear code. Different from
existing code constructions, the code proposed in this work is asymmetric, and this asymmetry
appears to be the key to the significant reductions in the message size and the upload cost
compared to other capacity-achieving codes.
2. Secondly, through a novel and delicate analysis of the converse proof of the PIR capacity,
we identify a set of critical properties for a class of capacity-achieving codes on abelian
groups, which we refer to as decomposable codes. Based on these properties we further derive
novel converses for the message size and the upload cost. These converse bounds match the
corresponding values in the proposed code, thus establishing the optimality of the proposed
code construction in terms of the message size and the upload cost within the corresponding
code classes, in particular, among capacity-achieving linear codes.
3. Last but not least, the relation between symmetric PIR codes and asymmetric PIR codes
is analyzed in details. The symmetry in this problem setting in fact includes three different
components, namely symmetry in server indices, symmetry in file indices, and symmetry
in the query answers. The analysis reveals certain fundamental structures in the problem
setting that were largely overlooked in the existing literature. Using these symmetry relations,
we show that the proposed code (in fact any asymmetric code) can be used to build more
symmetric PIR codes, which offers a bridge between the proposed code and the existing code
constructions.
It should be noted that efforts on the PIR problem in the theoretical computer science com-
munity focus on an alternative formulation where the message length L is assumed to be small
and fixed, usually a single bit, but the number of messages and the number of servers are allowed
to grow asymptotically [23]. In this setting, the overall communication cost can be viewed as
consisting of upload cost and download cost, the latter of which is inversely proportional to the
retrieval rate, and they can be traded off between each other. In fact, there exists a complex
relation among the three quantities of the message size, the upload cost, and the download cost.
For example, for the solution of retrieving everything, the upload cost is 0 as nothing needs to be
sent to the servers (i.e., there is no randomness in the queries) and the download cost is KL as
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all messages are retrieved, and the message size can be L = 1 bit each. Characterizing even the
sum cost of upload and download for the case L = 1 in the original theoretical computer science
formulation appears to be intractable, and instead order-wise bounds have been investigated; there
have been considerable efforts and many significant results after the ground-breaking work of [23];
see e.g., [24–29]. Against this general backdrop, our result can be viewed as the first to precisely
determine the relation among the message size, the upload cost, and the download cost, for the
extreme point when the download cost is minimized.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the problem definition and the
necessary notation. Section 3 gives the proposed PIR code construction. The converse results on
the minimum message size and the minimum upload cost are given in Section 4, and the symmetry
relations are discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Model and Preliminaries
In this section, we provide a formal problem definition, as well as the necessary notation for sub-
sequent discussions. A slightly different indexing method is chosen in this work: instead of the
more conventional indexing of starting at 1, the indexing here starts at 0. This does not make any
essential difference in the problem and the solution, however it will lead to notional simplicity when
we present the new code construction.
2.1 System Model
The private information retrieval model can be formally described as follows. There are a total
of N servers, each storing a copy of K messages, denoted as W0,W1, . . . ,WK−1, respectively. A
user wishes to retrieve a message Wk, k ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,K − 1}, however at the same time wishes
to keep the identity of the message being retrieved as a secret to any one of the servers. For
this purpose, the user, using a random input F as the key, chooses a set of queries, Q0:N−1 =
(Q0, Q1, . . . , QN−1), one per server, and sends the queries to the servers. Server-n responds with
an answer An, which depends on the messages stored at the server and the received query. Using
all the answers A0:N−1 = (A0, A1, . . . , AN−1) from all the servers, together with the values of F
and k, the user then reconstructs Wk. The privacy requirement stipulates that at each server, the
probability distributions on the allowed queries are identical for all the messages, thus the server
cannot learn any information regarding which message is being requested.
We now give a more mathematically precise description of the problem. Denote the set of
possible queries for server-n as Qn, and denote its cardinality as |Qn|. The cardinality of a set A
will be similarly denoted as |A| in the rest of the paper. Assume that the random key F is uniformly
distributed on a certain finite set F . Moreover, a message Wk consists of L symbols, each symbol
belonging to a finite alphabet X ; in particular, for messages in computer systems, we usually use
X = {0, 1}. The messages are mutually independent, each of which is uniformly distributed on XL.
We further allow the query answers to be represented as a variable length vector, whose elements
are in the finite alphabet Y, though our code construction will eventually only use Y = X .
Definition 1. An N -server private information retrieval (PIR) code for K messages, each of
L-symbols in the alphabet X , consists of
1. N query functions:
φn : {0, 1, . . . ,K − 1} × F → Qn, n ∈ {0, , 1, ..., N − 1}, (2)
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i.e., the user chooses the query Q
[k]
n = φn(k,F) for server-n, using the index of the desired
message and the random key F;
2. N answer length functions:
ℓn : Qn → {0, 1, 2, . . .}, n ∈ {0, 1, ..., N − 1}, (3)
i.e., the length of the answer at each server, a non-negative integer, is a deterministic function
of the query, but not the particular realization of the messages;
3. N answer functions:
ϕn : Qn × X
KL → Yℓn , n ∈ {0, 1, ..., N − 1}, (4)
where ℓn = ℓn(qn) with qn ∈ Qn being the (random) query for server-n, Y is the coded symbol
alphabet, and in the sequel we shall write the query answer as A
[k]
n , ϕn(Q
[k]
n ,W0:K−1) when
the message index k is relevant;
4. A reconstruction function using the answers from the servers together with the desired message
index and the random key:
ψ :
N−1∏
n=0
Yℓn × {0, 1, ...,K − 1} × F → XL, (5)
i.e., Wˆk = ψ(A
[k]
0:N−1, k,F) is the retrieved message.
These functions should satisfy the following two requirements:
1. Correctness: For any k ∈ {0, 1, ...,K − 1}, Wˆk =Wk.
2. Privacy: For every k, k′ ∈ {0, 1, ...,K − 1}, n ∈ {0, 1, ..., N − 1}, and q ∈ Qn,
Pr(Q[k]n = q) = Pr(Q
[k′]
n = q). (6)
The correctness condition here requires that the reconstructed message as a random variable
is the same as the requested message, and it thus inherently requires that for any realization of
F, the equality must hold. It is in fact without loss of generality to restrict F and Qn’s to be
certain finite sets of integers, however, we allow them to be more general sets, which will facilitate
describing more concisely the proposed PIR code construction. It is also worth noting that the
alphabet Y in the problem definition may be an abstract finite set, with no further structure
assigned to it. However, for any such a finite set, we can establish a bijective mapping between Y
and the set {0, 1, . . . , |Y| − 1}. By further enforcing an operation between any two elements in the
latter set (for example, modulo |Y| addition), the set Y can also be assigned an operation through
homomorphism. In other words, any abstract set Y can always be viewed as a finite group, however
requiring Y to be a finite group in the problem definition is unnecessary.
2.2 Two General Code Classes
We next define precisely the code classes in which we establish the optimality of our proposed
code construction. These definitions are technical, and the readers may wish to skip them at the
initial read and simply consider the more restricted code class of vector linear codes on a finite
field, without materially jeopardizing understanding the code construction in Section 3. These
two definitions only become important in Section 4 when the optimality of the proposed code
construction is established within these more general classes.
4
Definition 2. A PIR code is called decomposable, if Y is a finite abelian group, and for each fixed
n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1} and q ∈ Qn, the answer function ϕn(q,W0:K−1) can be written in the form
ϕn(q,W0:K−1) =
(
ϕ
(q)
n,0(W0:K−1), ϕ
(q)
n,1(W0:K−1), . . . , ϕ
(q)
n,ℓn−1
(W0:K−1)
)
, (7)
where
ϕ
(q)
n,i(W0:K−1) = ϕ
(q)
n,i,0(W0)⊕ ϕ
(q)
n,i,1(W1)⊕ . . .⊕ ϕ
(q)
n,i,K−1(WK−1), i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ℓn − 1} (8)
where ⊕ represents addition in the finite group Y, and each ϕ
(q)
n,i,k is a mapping X
L → Y.
The terminology “decomposable” comes from (8) which restricts each coded symbol to be a
summation (in the abelian group) of the component functions on the individual messages. Let us
consider an example where the two messages, each of a single symbol, are in certain ring (Y,⊕,⊗),
and the resulting answer for n = q = 0 is
ϕ0(0, (W0,W1)) = (ϕ
(0)
0,0(W0,W1), ϕ
(0)
0,1(W0,W1), ϕ
(0)
0,2(W0,W1))
=
(
(W0 ⊗W0)⊕ α, (W0 ⊗W0)⊕ (W1 ⊗W1)⊕ α, (W1 ⊗W1)⊕ α
)
,
where α is an element of the ring. This code belongs to the code class of decomposable codes, but
it is clearly not linear. In the component function ϕ
(0)
0,1(W0,W1), we have
ϕ
(0)
0,1(W0,W1) = ϕ
(0)
0,1,0(W0)⊕ ϕ
(0)
0,1,1(W1) = (W0 ⊗W0)⊕ ((W1 ⊗W1)⊕ α).
Definition 3. If a decomposable PIR code has the property that any component function ϕ
(q)
n,i,k in
(8) either satisfies the condition∣∣∣{w ∈ XL : ϕ(q)n,i,k(w) = g}∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣{w ∈ XL : ϕ(q)n,i,k(w) = g′}∣∣∣ , ∀g, g′ ∈ Y, (9)
or it maps everything to the same value, i.e.,
ϕ
(q)
n,i,k(w) = ϕ
(q)
n,i,k(w
′), ∀w,w′ ∈ XL, (10)
then the PIR code is called uniformly decomposable.
A uniformly decomposable PIR code has the property that the decomposed message mappings
ϕ
(q)
n,i,k will preserve a uniform probability distribution on the coded symbol alphabet, unless the
induced random variable is in fact deterministic. The notion of decomposable codes considerably
generalizes the notion of linear codes. In particular, linear codes on finite fields are uniformly
decomposable, and linear codes defined on modules over a ring [30,31] are decomposable (and some
are uniformly decomposable); it also naturally includes codes defined on cosets of a binary lattice
and some nonlinear codes. In Section 4, we establish general outer bounds for decomposable codes,
which imply that the proposed code is optimal in the corresponding code classes, and particularly,
it is optimal among all linear codes.
Decomposable codes can be simply represented as
ϕn(q,W0:K−1) =W0:K−1 ·G
(q)
n , (11)
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where W0:K−1 is viewed as a length-K vector whose components are in the alphabet X
L, and G
(q)
n
is a matrix of dimension K×ℓn whose elements G
(q)
n,i,k are functions X
L → Y with the “·” operation
between Wk and the matrix element G
(q)
n,i,k defined as
Wk ·G
(q)
n,i,k , ϕ
(q)
n,i,k(Wk). (12)
Consider another example (a uniformly decomposable code) where K = 3, L = 1, and the
answer for query q = 0 for server-0 is
ϕ0(q = 0,W[0:2]) = ϕ
(0)
0,0(W0,W1,W2) =W0 ⊖W2 (13)
where X = Y is the finite group {0, 1, 2, 3} with ⊕ and ⊖ being the modulo-4 addition and sub-
traction. Then we have
ϕ0(q = 0,W[0:2]) = ϕ
(0)
0,0,0(W0)⊕ ϕ
(0)
0,0,1(W1)⊕ ϕ
(0)
0,0,2(W2) = (W0)⊕ (0)⊕ (⊖W2)
= [W0,W1,W2] ·G
(0)
0 = [W0,W1,W2]

 10
−1

 , (14)
In the matrix representation, G
(0)
0 = [1, 0,−1]
t, where 1 stands for the identity function, 0 for the
all zero function, and −1 for the negation function.
For linear codes defined on a finite field X , the function ϕ
(q)
n,i,k(Wk) is the inner product between
the length-L message vector Wk, and a fixed length-L coding coefficient vector in the same finite
field. In this case, W0:K−1 can be alternatively written as a length-KL vector in the alphabet X ,
and the matrix G
(q)
n can be further expanded as a KL× ℓn matrix whose elements are also in X ,
and the finite field addition and multiplication will be used in the matrix multiplication. Such a
matrix G
(q)
n is in fact simply the familiar generator matrix of (vector) linear codes [32].
It should be noted that most converse results on linear codes in the literature have been estab-
lished by deriving relations among the ranks of the coding matrices, whereas our converse proof
in Section 4 is information-theoretic in nature. The benefit of our approach is that it allows us to
derive converse bounds for the general class of codes in a single framework.
2.3 Performance Metrics
The performance of an N -server PIR code can be measured using the following three quantities:
1. The retrieval rate
R ,
L log2 |X |
log2 |Y|
∑N−1
n=0 E(ℓn)
, (15)
which is the number of bits of desired message information that can be privately retrieved
per bit of downloaded data. This quantity should be maximized, because higher rate implies
fewer number of bits to be downloaded when retrieving a message. It was shown in [1] that
the retrieval rate is upper-bounded by the PIR capacity C, i.e., R ≤ C, which is a function
of (N,K) as given in (1).
2. The message size L log2 |X |, which is the number of bits to represent each individual message.
This quantity should also be minimized, because PIR schemes for a larger message size can
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Table 1: Answers for message A and B for (N,K) = (2, 2) in a simple code.
Requesting A Requesting B
Server-1 Server-2 Server-1 Server-2
F = 0 0 a 0 b
F = 1 a+ b b a+ b a
be constructed by concatenating multiple schemes for a smaller message size, but not vice
versa. Therefore, in practical applications, a smaller message size implies a more versatile
code design; similar considerations of reducing the sub-packetization factor also exist for the
regenerating code problem, e.g., [33–37], and the coded caching problem, e.g., [38–40]. Note
that we refer to the parameter L as the message length, while the definition of the message
size also takes into account the alphabet size |X |.
3. The upload cost
N−1∑
n=0
log2 |Qn|, (16)
which is the number of bits required to send the queries to the servers. This quantity should
be minimized for an efficient PIR code, since a smaller upload cost implies less user-to-server
communication, and simpler server functions as mentioned earlier.
The code construction we shall propose in this work is optimal in the following senses:
1. It is capacity-achieving R = C, i.e., the retrieval rate is optimal;
2. It has the smallest, thus optimal, message size among all capacity-achieving uniformly de-
composable codes;
3. It has the smallest, thus optimal, upload cost among all capacity-achieving decomposable
codes.
3 A New Capacity-Achieving PIR Code
In this section, we provide the details of the proposed codes. Before presenting the code construction
under general parameters, we provide a motivating example for the case of (N,K) = (2, 2).
3.1 A Motivating Example (N,K) = (2, 2)
Let us consider two different codes for the (N,K) = (2, 2) case.
• A very simple but new capacity-achieving code is as given in Table 1, where 0 in the trans-
mission means no symbol is transmitted. Here the two messages A = (a) and B = (b), each
of which has only 1 symbol. The random key is binary, uniformly distributed in the key set
F = {0, 1}. It can be seen that the expected download cost is 0.5 + 1 = 1.5, and thus the
rate is 2/3, which achieves the capacity.
• In comparison, in the code constructed in [1], the two messages A = (a1, a2, a3, a4) and B =
(b1, b2, b3, b4) each have 4 symbols. The random key set F is the collection of permutation π(·),
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Table 2: Answers for message A and B for (N,K) = (2, 2) in [1].
Requesting A Requesting B
Server-1 Server-2 Server-1 Server-2
a, b, a♣ + b♦ a♦, b♦, a♥ + b a, b, a♦ + b♣ a♦, b♦, a + b♥
which is used to select the one-to-one correspondence between {1, 2, 3, 4} and {,♦,♣,♥}.
With this correspondence determined, the code is as given in Table 2. The download cost is
6 symbols, and the rate is thus 2/3.
It is observed that in the simple new code, the message sizes for different queries are allowed
to vary, while the code constructed in [1] uses answers of the same length, regardless of the key
realization and the query.
3.2 The New PIR Code
The code we propose, which will be referred to as the N -ary-indexed PIR code, has the following
parameter:
L = N − 1. (17)
The query sets at the servers are defined as
Qn ,
{
qn,0:K−1 , (qn,0, qn,1, . . . , qn,K−1) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}
K
∣∣∣∣
(
K−1∑
k=0
qn,k
)
N
= n
}
,
n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}, (18)
where (·)N means the modulo N operation. In other words, the queries are length-K vectors,
whose elements are in the set {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}; the query set for server-n is all such vectors whose
elements sum up to n under modulo N . It is easy to see that
|Qn| = N
K−1, n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}, (19)
since the first K − 1 digits of the query, i.e., (qn,0, qn,1, . . . , qn,K−2), can take any value in the set
{0, 1, . . . , N − 1}K−1, however, for a fixed server-n, the last digit is then uniquely determined in
the set Qn.
The sample space of the random key is defined as F = {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}K−1, and thus the
random key F can be written as
F = (F0,F1, . . . ,FK−2), (20)
where Fk ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}, k = 0, 1, . . . ,K − 2. Each message Wk, k ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,K − 1}, is a
length-L vector and thus by pre-pending a dummy variable Wk,0 , 0, can be written as
Wk = (Wk,0,Wk,1, . . . ,Wk,N−1), (21)
where (Wk,1, . . . ,Wk,N−1) is the true information payload of the message Wk. Without loss of
generality, we shall assume X = {0, 1, · · · , |X | − 1}, which, together with the modulo addition
operation ⊕, forms a finite group (X ,⊕). This includes the particularly attractive choice of X =
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{0, 1}, where each symbol is a bit and the group addition is simply binary XOR, and in this case,
the binary group can also be viewed as the binary field.
We next provide the precise forms of the four coding functions with the parameter and the
relevant sets defined above, which constitute the proposed code:
1. The query function φn for n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1} is
Q[k]n = φn(k,F) = (F0,F1,Fk−1, (n− F
∗
k)N ,Fk, . . . ,FK−2) , (22)
where F∗k ,
(∑K−2
i=0 Fi
)
N
. In other words, all digits except the k-th digit in the query vector
are copied from F, while the k-th digit is set to match the unique value in the query set at
this server. This query can be equivalently written as Q
[k]
n,0:K−1 since it is a length-K vector.
2. The answer length function ℓn for n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1} is
ℓn(n, q) =
{
0 (n, q) = (0, (0, 0, . . . , 0))
1 otherwise
. (23)
In other words, there is only one query at the 0-th server that will induce ℓ0 = 0, while all
other queries at all other servers will induce an answer of a single symbol.
3. The answer function ϕn for n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1} is
A[k]n = ϕn(Q
[k]
n,0:K−1,W0:K−1)
=W
0,Q
[k]
n,0
⊕W
1,Q
[k]
n,1
⊕ . . .⊕W
K−1,Q
[k]
n,K−1
=Wk,(n−F∗k)N
⊕
(
W0,F0 ⊕ . . . ⊕Wk−1,Fk−1 ⊕Wk+1,Fk ⊕ . . .⊕WK−1,FK−2
)
, (24)
where ⊕ is the addition operation in the group X . For conciseness, we shall define
F ,W0,F0 ⊕ . . .⊕Wk−1,Fk−1 ⊕Wk+1,Fk ⊕ . . .⊕WK−1,FK−2 . (25)
4. The answers from the servers are
A[k]n =Wk,(n−F∗k)N
⊕ F, n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}. (26)
The message Wk can now be reconstructed by computing
Wk,(n−F∗k)N
= A[k]n ⊖A
[k]
F
∗
k
= A[k]n ⊖ F, n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}, (27)
where ⊖ is the subtraction operation in the abelian group X .
The correctness of this code is almost immediate, once we observe that in (27), as n ranges
in the set {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}, the corresponding value (n− F∗k)N exhausts all possible values in
{0, 1, . . . , N − 1} as well. This implies all the elements Wk,n, n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1} are recovered,
and thus the message is correctly reconstructed. The privacy of the code is also almost immediate,
as for any k ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,K − 1}, n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}, and q ∈ Qn,
Pr(Q[k]n = q) = N
−K+1, (28)
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i.e., the queries are sent to a server with a uniform distribution on the respective query set. Since
at each server, each answer is sent with probability N−K+1, and only one answer in server-0 has
length 0 while all other answers have length 1, the rate of the code is
R =
N − 1
(1−N−K+1) + (N − 1)
=
N − 1
N −N−K+1
=
(
1 +
1
N
+
1
N2
+ . . .+
1
NK−1
)−1
= C, (29)
i.e., achieving the capacity. The upload cost is simply given by
N log2N
K−1 = N(K − 1) log2N, (30)
which is roughly linear in K for any fixed N .
We summarize the properties of the proposed PIR code construction in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The N -ary-indexed PIR code is correct, privacy-preserving, and capacity-achieving.
Among all capacity-achieving uniformly decomposable PIR codes, it has the smallest message size,
which is N − 1. Among all capacity-achieving decomposable PIR codes, it has the lowest upload
cost, which is N(K − 1) log2N .
The optimality in terms of the message size and the upload cost is proved in Section 4. The
capacity-achieving code in [1] has a message size of L = NK and an upload cost of NK log2(
NK !
NK−1!
),
while the one in [21] has a message size1 of L = NK−1 and an upload cost of NK log2(
NK−1!
NK−2!
).
Therefore, the proposed code construction is able to provide an exponential order of improvements
over the existing ones in the literature.
3.3 An Example for (N,K) = (3, 3)
Here we use (N,K) = (3, 3) to illustrate the general code construction. The code will have L =
N − 1 = 2, and we shall denote W0 = (a1, a2),W1 = (b1, b2),W2 = (c1, c2), where all the elements
are in the binary field {0, 1}. As described in the general code construction, we extend these
messages by pre-pending one dummy element to each of them, denoted as a0 = b0 = c0 = 0, to
form
W0 = (a0, a1, a2),W1 = (b0, b1, b2),W2 = (c0, c1, c2). (31)
In Table 3, we provide the query set Qn at each server, as well as the corresponding answers.
Let us consider the case where the random key is chosen to be F = (0, 2), and the message being
requested is W1, then the three queries sent to the servers are
q0 = (0, 1, 2), q1 = (0, 2, 2), q2 = (0, 0, 2), (32)
i.e., the middle digit in the query is chosen to be the unique value in each query set, and the other
two digits are set according to F = (0, 2). The answers are thus
A0 = a0 ⊕ b1 ⊕ c2 = b1 ⊕ c2, A1 = a0 ⊕ b2 ⊕ c2 = b2 ⊕ c2, A2 = a0 ⊕ b0 ⊕ c2 = c2. (33)
1The definition of retrieval rate (15) is given in terms of the inverse of the expected number of downloaded symbols
(over all random queries), which is in line with the approach taken in [1]. In [21], an alternative definition was adopted,
where the retrieval rate was defined in terms of the inverse of the maximum number of downloaded symbols (among
all possible queries). Under the alternative definition of [21], the minimum message size was shown to be NK−1 for
any capacity-achieving codes. In a sense, our result shows that this subtle difference in the problem definition in fact
induces a significant difference in terms of the optimal message sizes.
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Table 3: The query sets and the answers at the servers.
Server-0 Server-1 Server-2
Q0 answers Q1 answers Q2 answers
000 0 001 a0 ⊕ b0 ⊕ c1 002 a0 ⊕ b0 ⊕ c2
012 a0 ⊕ b1 ⊕ c2 010 a0 ⊕ b1 ⊕ c0 011 a0 ⊕ b1 ⊕ c1
021 a0 ⊕ b2 ⊕ c1 022 a0 ⊕ b2 ⊕ c2 020 a0 ⊕ b2 ⊕ c0
102 a1 ⊕ b0 ⊕ c2 100 a1 ⊕ b0 ⊕ c0 101 a1 ⊕ b0 ⊕ c1
111 a1 ⊕ b1 ⊕ c1 112 a1 ⊕ b1 ⊕ c2 110 a1 ⊕ b1 ⊕ c0
120 a1 ⊕ b2 ⊕ c0 121 a1 ⊕ b2 ⊕ c1 122 a1 ⊕ b2 ⊕ c2
201 a2 ⊕ b0 ⊕ c1 202 a2 ⊕ b0 ⊕ c2 200 a2 ⊕ b0 ⊕ c0
210 a2 ⊕ b1 ⊕ c0 211 a2 ⊕ b1 ⊕ c1 212 a2 ⊕ b1 ⊕ c2
222 a2 ⊕ b2 ⊕ c2 220 a2 ⊕ b2 ⊕ c0 221 a2 ⊕ b2 ⊕ c1
It is clear that b1 and b2 can be recovered from these answers by subtracting A2 = c2 from A0 and
A1. The code is also privacy-preserving, since regardless of the message being requested, a query
element is being sent with probability 1/9. The retrieval rate is also easy to compute as
R =
2
1
9 ∗ 2 +
8
9 ∗ 3
=
9
13
, (34)
which matches the capacity of this system.
Remark: The queries in each row of Table 3 are intentionally arranged to have the first two
digits being the same, for ease of inspection.
4 Lower Bounding the Message Size and the Upload Cost
The minimum upload cost and the minimum message size are closely related to the retrieval rate
of a PIR code. For example, a naive PIR code where everything is downloaded can have upload
cost of 0, and message size of 1, however a more efficient PIR code will need to induce a larger
message size and a higher upload cost. In this work, we consider the minimum upload cost and the
minimum message size when the retrieval rate is maximized and when the codes are decomposable,
i.e., capacity-achieving decomposable codes. We will show, through a delicate set of relations
among the coding function matrices G
(q)
n ’s, that the capacity-achieving requirement forces the PIR
codes to have certain algebraic structure, which can be utilized to derive the desired lower bounds.
4.1 Properties of Capacity-Achieving Decomposable Codes
We first provide a detailed analysis of capacity-achieving codes, from which three important prop-
erties are derived, given in two lemmas. The analysis is a refinement of the converse proof given
in [1], however, with the emphasis on the necessary conditions for optimal codes. A similar ap-
proach was used in [41] to analyze optimal joint source-channel codes, and in [43] to facilitate
reverse-engineering code designs.
Lemma 1. For any PIR code, we have
I
(
W0:k−1,k+1:K−1;A
[k]
0:N−1
∣∣∣Wk,F) ≤ L(1/R − 1) log2 |X | , k ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,K − 1}. (35)
11
Moreover, for any PIR code that the equality holds for all k ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,K−1} in (35), let q0:N−1 =
(q0, q1, . . . , qN−1) be a set of queries for which Pr(Q
[k]
0:N−1 = q0:N−1) > 0 for some k ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,K−
1}, then the code must have
P1. Independence of the retrieved data: the N random variables A
(q0)
0 , A
(q1)
1 , . . . , A
(qN−1)
N−1 are mu-
tually independent, where A
(qn)
n is the answer from server-n when the query Q
[k]
n = qn.
The proof of this lemma is given in the appendix. The property P1 is obtained by setting the
inequality (35) to equality, which forces the intermediate steps to also become inequality, and then
extracting the independence implied by such information theoretic equality.
Remark: For decomposable codes, we can further write(
A
(q0)
0 , A
(q1)
1 , . . . , A
(qN−1)
N−1
)
=
(
W0:K−1 ·G
(q0)
0 ,W0:K−1 ·G
(q1)
1 , . . . ,W0:K−1 ·G
(qN−1)
N−1
)
. (36)
Also note that for linear codes, the independence relation given above implies that the columns of
the matrices G
(q0)
0 , G
(q1)
1 , . . . , G
(qN−1)
N−1 are linearly independent. Recall that for decomposable codes,
the answer for a query Qn = q at server-n can be written as W0:K−1 ·G
(q)
n , or more concisely, some-
times represented by the coding function matrix G
(q)
n alone. The next lemma involves submatrices
of G
(q)
n , with the rows corresponding to a subset of the messages removed, say {Wi, i ∈ A}; we
shall write such a submatrix as G
(q)
n|A. For example, if (N,K) = (3, 3), and A = 1, then G
(1)
1|1 is the
submatrix of G
(1)
1 with the middle row corresponding to the message W1 removed.
Lemma 2. Let π : {0, 1, . . . ,K − 1} → {0, 1, . . . ,K − 1} be a permutation function. For any PIR
code, for any k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K − 1},
NI
(
Wπ(k:K−1);A
[π(k−1)]
0:N−1
∣∣∣Wπ(0:k−1),F) ≥ I (Wπ(k+1:K−1);A[π(k)]0:N−1∣∣∣Wπ(0:k),F)+ L log2 |X |. (37)
Moreover, for any decomposable code for which the equality holds for any k and π(·) in (37), let
q0:N−1 = (q0, q1, . . . , qN−1) be a set of queries for which Pr(Q
[k]
0:N−1 = q0:N−1) > 0 for the query of
the message Wk, and G
(q0)
0 , G
(q1)
1 , . . . , G
(qN−1)
N−1 be the corresponding answer coding matrices, then
P2. Identical information for the residuals: the N random variables
W0:k−1,k+1:K−1 ·G
(q0)
0|k ,W0:k−1,k+1:K−1 ·G
(q1)
1|k , ...,W0:k−1,k+1:K−1 ·G
(qN−1)
N−1|k
are deterministic of each other;
P3. Independence of the requested message signals: the random variables
Wk ·G
(q0)
0|0:k−1,k+1:K−1,Wk ·G
(q1)
1|0:k−1,k+1:K−1, . . . ,Wk ·G
(qN−1)
N−1|0:k−1,k+1:K−1
are independent.
The proof of this lemma can be found in the appendix.
Remark: The property of decomposable codes was used in the proof of Lemma 2, where the
answers are decomposed into separate components according to the messages Wk’s, with which
relations among these answers are derived. Such decomposition does not apply on other code
classes in general, and thus the proof cannot be carried through using the same argument.
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Theorem 2. Any capacity-achieving decomposable PIR code must have the properties P1-P3.
Proof. Let π : {0, 1, . . . ,K − 1} → {0, 1, . . . ,K − 1} be a permutation. Starting from Lemma 1, we
can write
L
R
− L ≥ I
(
Wπ(1:K−1);A
[π(0)]
0:N−1
∣∣∣Wπ(0),F)
≥
L
N
+
1
N
I
(
Wπ(2:K−1);A
[π(1)]
0:N−1
∣∣∣Wπ(0:1),F)
≥ ...
≥ L
(
1
N
+ . . .+
1
NK−1
)
, (38)
where all the other inequalities are by recursively applying Lemma 2, and it follows that R ≤ C.
For any decomposable code that satisfies R = C, all the inequalities in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2
must be equality for any permutation π, and according to the lemmas, such decomposable codes
must have properties P1 -P3.
4.2 Minimum Message Size
We have the following theorem, which provides a lower bound on the minimum message size for
capacity-achieving uniformly decomposable codes.
Theorem 3. The message size of any uniformly decomposable capacity-achieving PIR code is
greater than or equal to (N − 1) log2 |Y|; in particular, it must be greater than or equal to (N − 1).
Remark: Clearly this implies that the standard linear codes defined on finite fields are lower
bounded by the same values. Note also that the bound (N − 1) log2 |Y| is dependent on Y but not
X , which reflects the fact that the representation of the message is of little fundamental importance
because we can always use an equivalent representation.
Proof. Let us consider a capacity-achieving uniformly decomposable PIR code, and the request
to retrieve the message Wk. Recall property P2 which states that W0:k−1,k+1:K−1 · G
(qn)
n|k , n ∈
{0, 1, . . . , N − 1}, are deterministic functions of each other. There must be a set of queries q0:N−1
with non-zero probability such that
H
(
W0:k−1,k+1:K−1 ·G
(qn)
n|k
)
6= 0, n = {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}, (39)
because otherwise, all answers will have the form
W0:K−1 ·G
(qn)
n =Wk ·G
(qn)
n|0:k−1,k+1:K+1 ⊕∆, n = {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}, (40)
where ∆ ∈ Y is a constant; this would imply that the answers only involve the message Wk but
not other messages, but such answers clearly cannot be both private and correct.
With such a set of queries q0:N−1 that (39) holds, consider property P3, which states that
Wk ·G
(q0)
0|0:k−1,k+1:K−1,Wk ·G
(q1)
1|0:k−1,k+1:K−1, . . . ,Wk ·G
(qN−1)
N−1|0:k−1,k+1:K−1, (41)
are independent, and our aim is to show that no more than one of their entropies can be zero. To
see this, assume otherwise, i.e., at least two of the entropies are zero. Without loss of generality,
let us assume that
H
(
Wk ·G
(q0)
0|0:k−1,k+1:K−1
)
= H
(
Wk ·G
(q1)
1|0:k−1,k+1:K−1
)
= 0, (42)
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implying that both Wk · G
(q0)
0|0:k−1,k+1:K−1 and Wk · G
(q1)
1|0:k−1,k+1:K−1 in fact take a fixed value,
independent of the value of Wk. However, this further implies that the retrieved messages from
server-0 and server-1 are
W0:K−1 ·G
(q0)
0 =W0:k−1,k+1:K−1 ·G
(q0)
0|k ⊕∆1,
W0:K−1 ·G
(q1)
1 =W0:k−1,k+1:K−1 ·G
(q1)
1|k ⊕∆2, (43)
where ∆1 and ∆2 are two constants in the abelian group Y. Because of property P2, the two
random variables in (43) are in fact deterministic of each other. However this contradicts property
P1 which states that the retrieved contents are independent (recall that their entropies are not
zero). Thus we can conclude that at least N − 1 of the entropies of the terms in (41) are not zero.
Because the function ϕ(q)(n, i, k) induces a uniform probability distribution on the coded symbol
alphabet Y, and moreover, by the independence property of P3, we can now conclude that the
message size must be greater than or equal to (N − 1) log2 |Y|. Since any meaningful alphabet Y
must satisfy |Y| ≥ 2, the message size must be greater than or equal to N − 1. The proof is thus
complete.
Remark: The property of uniformly decomposable codes is only invoked during the proof in the
last step, which requires the component functions to induce a uniform distribution on the coded
alphabet.
4.3 Minimum Upload Cost
Theorem 4. The upload cost of any capacity-achieving decomposable PIR code is greater than or
equal to N(K − 1) logN .
We need the following notion of distinctness in the proof.
Definition 4. Two random variables A and B are called information-theoretically distinct, or
simply distinct, if I(A;B) < max(H(A),H(B)).
According to this definition, if a random variable can be obtained from another through an
invertible transformation, they are not information-theoretically distinct.
Proof. We prove that for a capacity-achieving decomposable PIR code for N servers and K mes-
sages, the minimum upload cost to each server is at least (K−1) log2N , i.e., it is a lower bound on
log2 |Qn|, n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}. To begin the proof, we find a set of queries q0:N−1 for the message
W0, and assume that the answers have the property that the interference signal (i.e., the part of
the answer that is not the requested message) is not null, i.e.,
H
(
W1:K−1 ·G
(qn)
n|0
)
6= 0, n = {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}, (44)
which always exists using the same argument as in Theorem 2; c.f. (39). This implies that at least
for one of the interference signals k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K − 1} we have
H
(
Wk ·G
(qn)
n|0:k−1,k+1:K−1
)
6= 0, n = {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}, (45)
due to property P2. Without loss of generality, let us assume it is k = K − 1. With this set of
queries, following the argument in Theorem 2, at most one of the entropies
H
(
W0 ·G
(qn)
n|1:K−1
)
, n = {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}, (46)
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can be zero. Again without loss of generality, assume it is n = 0. We shall denote a particular
answer from a server as Va0,a1,...,aK−1 , the meaning of which will soon become apparent.
Since the queries q0:N−1 are for the message W0, the answers from the N servers, respectively,
V0,0,0,...,0, V1,0,0,...,0, . . . , VN−1,0,0,...,0, (47)
can be used to recover W0, and moreover, the W0 component functions
W0 ·G
(qn)
n|1:K−1, n = {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}, (48)
are all information-theoretically distinct by property P3, and the fact that at most one of them
can have zero entropy. We indicate this distinctness by the subscript in the answers (47) in the
0-th position.
Due to the privacy constraint, each answer in (47) can also be used to reconstruct W1, together
with some other answers, i.e.,
Server 0 Server 1 Server 2 ... Server N − 1
V0,0,0,...,0, V0,1,0,...,0, V0,2,0,...,0, . . . V0,N−1,0,...,0 →W1
V1,N−1,0,...,0, V1,0,0,...,0, V1,1,0,...,0, . . . V1,N−2,0,...,0 →W1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
VN−1,1,0,...,0, VN−1,2,0,...,0, VN−1,3,0,...,0, . . . VN−1,0,0,...,0 →W1,
(49)
where in each row, the results produced by the component functions on W0,2:N−1 in the answers
are deterministic functions of each other across different servers, due to property P2. Moreover,
for these answers, the component WK−1 must satisfy
H
(
WK−1 ·G
(qn)
n|0:K−2
)
6= 0, n = {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}, (50)
due to our assumption on (45) holding for k = K − 1. As a consequence, in each row of (49),
the component functions W1 ·G
(q)
n|0,2:K−1 are again distinct. Note however, across rows of (49), the
component functions on W1 in the answers are not necessarily distinct or identical. However, the
component functions W0:1 ·G
(q)
n|2:K−1 of the answers in (49) are all distinct, since they have distinct
W0 component functions in different rows , (i.e., for answers in different rows, the W0 component
functions are (48)), while for answers in the same row, the W1 component functions are distinct.
Thus there are at least N answers with distinct component functions W0:1 · G
(q)
n|2:K−1
at server-n,
which are the answers with the sum of the indices equal to n modulo N , given in the same column
in (49).
Next consider each answer in (49), which can also be used to recover W2 due to the privacy
requirement. For example, if we focus on the answers VN−1,2,0,...,0 and V1,1,0,...,0, which are from
server 1 and server 2, respectively, they can be used to recover W2 with some other answers
Server 0 Server 1 Server 2 ... Server N − 1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
VN−1,2,N−1,...,0, VN−1,2,0,...,0, VN−1,2,1,...,0, . . . VN−1,2,N−2,...,0 →W2
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
V1,1,N−2,...,0, V1,1,N−1,...,0, V1,1,0,...,0, . . . V1,1,N−3,...,0 →W2
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(51)
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Again these answers are distinct through a similar argument as before. Using this argument on
all the answers in (49) for the retrieval of W2, it can seen that across all the servers, there are at
least N3 answers, whose component functions W0:2 ·G
(q)
n|3:K−1 are all distinct, and each server has
at least N2 answers whose corresponding component functions are distinct. We can continue this
line of argument for messages W3,W4, . . . ,WK−2, resulting in a total of N
K−1 answers at all the
servers (NK−2 at each server) in the form of
Va0,a1,...,aK−2,0, ak ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}, (52)
whose component functions W0:K−2 ·G
(q)
n|K−1 are distinct.
Next consider the reconstruction of the message WK−1, for which we need to be more careful.
In this case, we cannot assume the interference signals in the retrieval are not null, becauseWK−1 is
now the requested message, and the condition (50) becomes insufficient; thus the component func-
tions of WK−1 in the answers cannot be guaranteed to be all distinct during a retrieval. However,
notice that due to the distinctness of the component functions W0:K−2 ·G
(q)
n|K−1 in all the answers
in (52), at most one of these component functions can have zero entropy, i.e., in these answers,
there is at most one of them satisfying,
H
(
W0:K−2 ·G
(q)
n|K−1
)
= 0. (53)
For all other answers that (53) does not hold, our previous induction argument based on the
distinctness of the signal components still applies. For the one exception answer where (53) holds,
which we assume without of generality to be V0,0,...,0, the answers to recover WK−1 can be labeled
as
V0,0,...,0, V0,0,...,1, . . . , V0,0,...,N−1, (54)
which may not be all distinct since there may be more than one item with zero entropy. However,
since they are placed at different servers, each one of them is distinct from all other answers at the
same server.
We have shown that at server-n, n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N −1}, there are at least NK−1 distinct answers
Va0,a1,...,aK−1 in the form of (
K−1∑
k=0
ak
)
N
= n, (55)
implying |Qn| ≥ N
K−1. Our proof is now complete.
Remark: Although Theorem 4 is stated in terms of the total upload cost, in the proof, we
have actually shown that the upload cost at each individual server is greater than or equal to
(K − 1) logN .
5 Symmetry and Symmetrized Codes
The proposed code construction is able to achieve exponential improvements over the existing
capacity-achieving PIR codes in the literature, in terms of both the message size and the upload cost.
The question we wish to address in this section is what the root cause is for these improvements.
It is clear that the existing codes in the literature, such as [1, 2, 12, 14, 16, 21], are all symmetric,
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while our proposed code is not symmetric. It is thus natural to suspect that this symmetry vs.
asymmetry relation is the root cause, however, in order to better understand this issue, we have
to identify and evaluate carefully the symmetry relations in the problem. It should be noted that
the symmetrization techniques given this section should not be viewed as design requirements
stipulated by practical system design considerations, but rather should be viewed as theoretical
tools to pinpoint the key difference between our code construction and the existing ones, and
perhaps to help future investigations on the capacities of privacy-preserving primitives, as they
appear to be rather general.
Recall our discussion on the minimum upload cost, which is related to |Qn|. For simplicity,
we shall refer to the distinct answers (or precisely, distinct answer functions) at a server as the
varieties of the answers at this server2. This concept plays an instrumental role in the subsequent
discussion.
There are in fact three kinds of symmetry relations in this problem setting:
1. Server-symmetry: obtained by permuting the servers;
2. Message-symmetry: obtained by permuting the messages;
3. Variety-symmetry: obtained by compositing the varieties of answers.
Among the three types of symmetry relations, the variety-symmetry is the most interesting, and
appears unique to the PIR problem. Through this symmetry, it can be shown that without loss
of optimality on the retrieval rate, we can always assume that the varieties are requested with
a uniform distribution at any given server. These three symmetry components can be operated
in composition, and space sharing of all possible permuted codes eventually can yield a highly
symmetric code. In this section we shall provide a precise characterization of these three types of
symmetry relations, and discuss several consequences of these relations. Technically, this is accom-
plished by providing a new set of coding functions, which by space-sharing over some permutations
will induce certain symmetry relation on the coding rates and the probability distribution.
Central to these symmetry relations are the following random variables
{W0,W1, . . . ,WK−1}, {A
(0)
0 , A
(1)
0 , . . . , A
(|Q0|−1)
0 }, {A
(0)
1 , A
(1)
1 , . . . , A
(|Q1|−1)
1 }, . . . ,
. . . , {A
(0)
N−1, A
(1)
N−1, . . . , A
(|QN−1|−1)
N−1 }, (56)
where A
(q)
n is the answer at server-n for the query Qn = q. Note that A
(q)
n is a deterministic function
of the messages W0:K−1; this should be distinguished from A
[k]
n which is the (randomized) answer
for the request of the message Wk at server-n, and it is not a deterministic function of the messages
W0:K−1.
5.1 Server-symmetry
Let π(·) be a permutation function on the set {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}, which is the set of server indices.
For any PIR code which is specified by the four coding functions in Definition 1, a new set of coding
functions can be specified as
φˆn = φπ(n), ℓˆn = ℓπ(n), ϕˆn = ϕπ(n), n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1},
ψˆ(A0:N−1, k,F) = ψ(Aπ−1(0:N−1), k,F). (57)
2The term variety here should be distinguished from the algebraic variety concept in algebraic geometry.
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Let us examine an example where N = 4, and let
π([0, 1, 2, 3]) = [3, 0, 1, 2]. (58)
Then we have
φˆ0 = φ3, φˆ1 = φ0, φˆ2 = φ1, φˆ3 = φ2, (59)
that is, the query sent to server-0 in this new code is what was sent to server-3, etc.. Similarly,
ℓˆ0 = ℓ3, ℓˆ1 = ℓ0, ℓˆ2 = ℓ1, ℓˆ3 = ℓ2,
ϕˆ0 = ϕ3, ϕˆ1 = ϕ0, ϕˆ2 = ϕ1, ϕˆ3 = ϕ2, (60)
that is, the function to produce the answer (and the length of the answer) at server-0 in the
permuted code is what was used at server-3 for the same query value, etc.; moreover, for the
reconstruction function
ψˆ(A0, A1, A2, A3, k,F) = ψ(A1, A2, A3, A0, k,F), (61)
that is, the reconstructed message Wˆk using random key F, is in fact obtained by operating the
original function on the permuted answers, i.e., using the answer obtained from server-0 in the
place of what was for the answer from server-3, etc..
It is easy to see that this new set of coding functions is indeed privacy-preserving and correct,
since there is no essential change in the coding operations. A direct consequence of the definition
of the new code is reflected on the equivalence of the induced random variables in the two codes
{Wˆ0, Wˆ1, . . . , WˆK−1}, {Aˆ
(0)
0 , Aˆ
(1)
0 , . . . , Aˆ
(|Qˆ0|−1)
0 }, {Aˆ
(0)
1 , Aˆ
(1)
1 , . . . , Aˆ
(|Qˆ1|−1)
1 }, . . . ,
. . . , {Aˆ
(0)
N−1, Aˆ
(1)
N−1, . . . , Aˆ
(|QˆN−1|−1)
N−1 }
= {W0,W1, . . . ,WK−1}, {A
(0)
π(0), A
(1)
π(0), . . . , A
(|Qpi(0)|−1)
π(0) }, {A
(0)
π(1), A
(1)
π(1), . . . , A
(|Qpi(1)|−1)
π(1) }, . . . ,
. . . , {A
(0)
π(N−1), A
(1)
π(N−1), . . . , A
(|Qpi(N−1)|−1)
π(N−1) }. (62)
Next consider the following code constructed through the space-sharing technique using a base
code. Let each message consist of a total of NL symbols, and apply a permuted version of the
base code on each length-L sequence (and over the K messages), which corresponds to one of the
cyclic permutations on {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}. This space-sharing code is clearly privacy-preserving and
correct, and it has the property that |Qˆ0| = |Qˆ1| = . . . = |QˆN−1| =
∏N−1
n=0 |Qn|, i.e., the upload
costs to all the servers are the same. Moreover, the expected retrieval rates are also the same across
all the servers, i.e., E(ℓˆ0) = E(ℓˆ1) = . . . = E(ℓˆN−1).
We could also space share over longer messages of (N !)L symbols each, where for each length-L
sequence we apply the permuted coding function corresponding to one of the N ! permutations on
{0, 1, . . . , N − 1}. By leveraging (62), it is also possible to obtain an invariance in terms of the
joint entropy values of the subsets of the random variables. Such refined invariant relations are not
necessary for this work, however, similar relations have been shown to be important when deriving
information theoretic converse bounds [42,43] in other information systems.
It should be noted that although the expected numbers of retrieved symbols are the same across
the servers (and thus the retrieval rates are the same per server), this does not imply for each
individual set of queries q0:N−1 with non-zero probability, the numbers of symbols being retrieved
are the same as those for another set of queries q′0:N−1. To achieve such a fine level of invariance,
we will need to invoke the variety-symmetry, to be introduced in Section 5.3.
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5.2 Message-symmetry
Let π(·) be a permutation function on the set {0, 1, . . . ,K − 1}, which is the set of message indices.
For any PIR code which is specified by the four coding functions in Definition 1, a new set of coding
functions can be specified as
φ¯n = φn, ℓ¯n = ℓn, ϕ¯n(q,W0:K−1) = ϕn(q,Wπ(0:K−1)), n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1},
ψ¯(A0:N−1, k,F) = ψ(A0:N−1, π
−1(k),F). (63)
Let us examine an example where K = 3 and let
π([0, 1, 2]) = [2, 0, 1]. (64)
Then we have for the functions ϕ¯n
ϕ¯n(q,W0,W1,W2) = ϕn(q,W2,W0,W1), n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}, (65)
that is, the message W0 in the new code serves the role of W1 in the original code, etc..
For the reconstruction functions
ψ¯(A0:N−1, 0,F) = ψ(A0:N−1, 1,F), ψ¯(A0:N−1, 1,F) = ψ(A0:N−1, 2,F),
ψ¯(A0:N−1, 2,F) = ψ(A0:N−1, 0,F), (66)
that is, the message W0 is reconstructed in the same way as that for W1 in the base code, etc..
This new set of coding functions is again privacy-preserving and correct. A direct consequence
of the definition of the permuted code is reflected on the equivalence in the probability distribution
of the random variables
{W¯0, W¯1, . . . , W¯K−1}, {A¯
(0)
0 , A¯
(1)
0 , . . . , A¯
(|Q0|−1)
0 }, {A¯
(0)
1 , A¯
(1)
1 , . . . , A¯
(|Q1|−1)
1 }, . . . ,
. . . , {A¯
(0)
N−1, A¯
(1)
N−1, . . . , A¯
(|QN−1|−1)
N−1 }
d
= {Wπ−1(0),Wπ−1(1), . . . ,Wπ−1(K−1)}, {A
(0)
0 , A
(1)
0 , . . . , A
(|Q0|−1)
0 }, {A
(0)
1 , A
(1)
1 , . . . , A
(|Q1|−1)
1 }, . . . ,
. . . , {A
(0)
N−1, A
(1)
N−1, . . . , A
(|QN−1|−1)
N−1 }, (67)
where
d
= indicates equivalence in distribution, but not necessarily identical.
Next consider the following code constructed through the space-sharing technique using a base
code. Let each message consist of a total of (K!)L symbols, and apply a permuted version of the
base code on each length-L sequence (and across K messages), which corresponds to one of the
possible permutations on {0, 1, . . . ,K − 1}. This space-sharing code is clearly privacy-preserving
and correct, however it does not lead to any explicit symmetry relation on the coding rates and
the distribution on the queries. It does lead to more subtle invariant relations on the entropies of
the subsets of the random variables, e.g., the joint entropy of a subset of the answers and a subset
of the messages is invariant to which subset of messages is being involved. This symmetry cannot
produce the invariance on the individual varieties we mentioned earlier.
5.3 Variety-symmetry
The last symmetry we consider is produced by constructing a different set of queries (and answer
varieties) and a new random key Fˆ to retrieve the messages. The variety-symmetry is constructed
using a different mechanism than the previous two types of symmetry relations.
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Recall in the base code, the random key F is uniformly distributed on the alphabet F . In the
new code, the random key is uniformly distributed on the following set
F` , {f0:|F|−1 ∈ F
|F| : f0:|F|−1 is a permutation of the elements of F}. (68)
It follows that |F` | = |F|!. The new code operates as follows. The message has |F|L symbols, which
is partitioned into |F| length-L blocks. Suppose a particular random key realization F` = f0:|F|−1
is generated for the new code. For index i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , |F| − 1}, the corresponding i-th blocks
of the messages are encoded using the base code retrieval strategy determined by the key value
F = fi ∈ F .
This new code is clearly correct, and next we show that it is also privacy-preserving. Recall for
the request of the message Wk, the query for server-n is a deterministic function of the random
key F = f in the base code. Because in the new code, any valid key f0:|F|−1 is a permutation of
all the elements in F , the number of times that a particular query q ∈ Qn appears in such a query
sequence f0:|F|−1 at server-n is given by
κn,k(q) , |{f ∈ F : φn(k, f) = q}| . (69)
Because the base code is privacy-preserving, we have
κn(q) , κn,0(q) = κn,1(q) = . . . = κn,K−1(q), n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}, q ∈ Qn. (70)
The composition of any query q0:|F|−1 sent to server-n for the request of the message Wk in this
new code, which is a vector of length |F|, is thus given exactly by (70), and the only difference
among the queries is the patterns that these elements in Qn are arranged. Thus, the query set at
server-n is the constant composition set, i.e.,
Tn = {q0:|F|−1 ∈ Q
|F|
n : the number of appearances of any q ∈ Qn in q0:|F|−1 = κn(q)}. (71)
Due to the symmetry in F` and Tn, as well as the uniform distribution on F` , it is clear that the
distribution of the query on Tn is also uniform, regardless of the identity of the requested message.
Thus this new code is indeed privacy-preserving. As a direct consequence of the construction, at
each server, all the answer varieties also have the same numbers of symbols to transmit.
5.4 Applying the Symmetrization Techniques
Let us revisit our example for (N,K) = (2, 2) given in Section 3.1. To make a variety-symmetric
code, we let each message be 2 bits, denoted as A = (a1, a2), B = (b1, b2), respectively. The total
number of new varieties at each server is |Q`n| = 2!. This new code is illustrated in Table 4. It
can be seen that now at each server, the lengths of the answers are indeed the same. We can
further apply the server-symmetrization technique, which will produce a code quite similar to that
proposed in [1] and illustrated in Table 2.
We can apply the variety-symmetrization technique on our proposed code with more general
parameters. The message size will increase by a factor of NK−1, resulting in a total message size
of NK−1(N − 1) in the new symmetrized code. In [21], it was shown that if we insist that the
total number of retrieved symbols from all servers is the same for all possible query combinations,
then the minimum message size is NK−1. Our proposed code in Section 3.2 has a much smaller
message size of N − 1, but does not have this property which turns out to be rather restrictive.
On the other hand, the variety-symmetrized code based on our proposed code has a slightly larger
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Table 4: Answers for message A and B for (N,K) = (2, 2) after variety-symmetrization.
Requesting A Requesting B
Server-1 Server-2 Server-1 Server-2
F = (01) a2 + b2 a1, b2 a2 + b2 a2, b1
F = (10) a1 + b1 a2, b1 a1 + b1 a1, b2
message size of NK−1(N − 1) than the optimal value in the restricted setting of [21]. This rela-
tively small increase appears to have stemmed from the decoupled design strategy of applying the
symmetrization technique on a base code, instead of designing a symmetric code directly.
More generally, we can apply all three symmetrization techniques on any asymmetric code (in
any order) to obtain a code that is highly symmetric without jeopardizing the retrieval rate, but
at the expense of the message size and the upload cost. From this perspective, the reason behind
the small message size and upload cost of the proposed code is indeed its asymmetric nature.
6 Conclusion
We proposed a new capacity-achieving PIR code construction, which has the optimal message size
and the optimal upload cost. The key to the reduction of both factors, compared to existing
constructions, appears to be the asymmetry in the proposed code. In order to prove converse
bounds for the optimal message size and the optimal upload cost, we extracted certain critical
structures in the converse proof of the PIR capacity. The symmetry structure in the PIR problem
is of interest in its own right, and we provided a careful analysis of this structure, which can be
used to symmetrize any PIR code into its symmetric version.
Although in this work we have focused on the most canonical setting of the private information
retrieval problem, the proposed code construction using asymmetric structure can be extended to
more general settings, such as maximum distance separable code (MDS-coded) databases, which
will be reported elsewhere.
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A Proof of Technical Lemmas
Proof of Lemma 1. Without loss of generality, let us consider k = 0. We start by writing the
following chain of inequalities:
I
(
W1:K−1;A
[0]
0:N−1
∣∣∣W0,F)
(a)
= I
(
W1:K−1;A
[0]
0:N−1,W0
∣∣∣F)
= I
(
W1:K−1;A
[0]
0:N−1
∣∣∣F)+ I (W1:K−1;W0∣∣∣A[0]0:N−1,F)
(b)
= I
(
W1:K−1;A
[0]
0:N−1
∣∣∣F)
= H
(
A
[0]
0:N−1
∣∣∣F)−H (A[0]0:N−1∣∣∣W1:K−1,F)
= H
(
A
[0]
0:N−1
∣∣∣F)−H (W0, A[0]0:N−1∣∣∣W1:K−1,F)+H (W0∣∣∣A[0]0:N−1,W1:K−1,F)
(c)
= H
(
A
[0]
0:N−1
∣∣∣F)−H (W0|W1:K−1,F)
(d)
≤
[
L
R
− L
]
log2 |X |, (72)
where (a) is because the components of (W0,W1, . . . ,WK−1,F) are mutually independent, (b) and
(c) are due to the retrieval correctness requirement and the fact that A0:N−1 is a deterministic
function of (W0:K−1,F), and (d) is by the definition of the retrieval rate.
To see the independence condition P1 , let us consider (d), and we can write
H(A
[0]
0:N−1|F) =
∑
q0:N−1
Pr(Q
[0]
0:N−1 = q0:N−1)H
(
A
[0]
0:N−1
∣∣∣Q[0]0:N−1 = q0:N−1)
=
∑
q0:N−1
Pr(Q
[0]
0:N−1 = q0:N−1)H
(
A
(q0)
0 , A
(q1)
1 , . . . , A
(qN−1)
N−1
)
(e)
≤
∑
q0:N−1
Pr(Q
[0]
0:N−1 = q0:N−1)
N−1∑
n=0
H
(
A(qn)n
)
≤
∑
q0:N−1
Pr(Q
[0]
0:N−1 = q0:N−1)
N−1∑
n=0
ℓn log2 |Y|
= log2 |Y|
N−1∑
n=0
E(ℓn)
=
L
R
log2 |X |. (73)
For the equality to hold, it is clear that (e) must be equality for any q0:N−1 of non-zero probability,
and thus the independence condition P1 must hold for k = 0. However, by choosing a permutation
π on {0, 1, . . . ,K − 1} such that π(k) = 0 and using the same line of proof, it can be concluded
that the independence condition holds for all coding matrices of any given requested message. The
proof is thus complete.
Proof of Lemma 2. Without loss of generality, let us consider the identity permutation function
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π(k) = k. We can start by writing the following chain of information inequalities:
NI
(
Wk:K−1;A
[k−1]
0:N−1
∣∣∣W0:k−1,F)
(a)
≥
N−1∑
n=0
I
(
Wk:K−1;A
[k−1]
n
∣∣∣W0:k−1,F)
(b)
=
N−1∑
n=0
I
(
Wk:K−1;A
[k]
n
∣∣∣W0:k−1,F)
(c)
=
N−1∑
n=0
H
(
A[k]n
∣∣∣W0:k−1,F)
(d)
≥
N−1∑
n=0
H
(
A[k]n
∣∣∣W0:k−1,F, A[k]0:n−1)
=
N−1∑
n=0
I
(
Wk:K−1;A
[k]
n
∣∣∣W0:k−1,F, A[k]0:n−1)
= I
(
Wk:K−1;A
[k]
0:N−1
∣∣∣W0:k−1,F)
(e)
= I
(
Wk:K−1;Wk, A
[k]
0:N−1
∣∣∣W0:k−1,F)
= L log2 |X |+ I
(
Wk+1:K−1;A
[k]
0:N−1
∣∣∣W0:k,F) , (74)
where (c) is because the answers are deterministic functions of the messages and the random key F,
(e) is due to the retrieval correctness requirement, and the equality (b) can be justified as follows.
We can write that
I
(
Wk:K−1;A
[k−1]
n
∣∣∣W0:k−1,F)
= H
(
A[k−1]n
∣∣∣W0:k−1,F)−H (A[k−1]n ∣∣∣W0:K−1,F)
= H
(
A[k−1]n
∣∣∣W0:k−1,F)
(f)
= H
(
A[k−1]n
∣∣∣W0:k−1, Q[k−1]n )
(g)
= H
(
A[k]n
∣∣∣W0:k−1, Q[k]n )
(h)
= H
(
A[k]n
∣∣∣W0:k−1,F)−H (A[k]n ∣∣∣W0:K−1,F)
= I
(
Wk:K−1;A
[k]
n
∣∣∣W0:k−1,F) , (75)
where (f) is due to the Markov string (A
[k]
n ,W0:K−1) ↔ Q
[k]
n ↔ F, (g) is because of the privacy
constraint, and (h) is because of the afore-mentioned Markov string and the fact that Q
[k]
n is a
deterministic function of F.
The inequalities (a) and (d) are due to the standard non-negativity property of mutual infor-
mation. However, the necessary conditions stated in the lemma can be derived from these two
inequalities. First consider when (a) is equality, from which we must have for decomposable codes
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that
0 = H
(
A
[0]
0:N−1
∣∣∣A[0]n ,W0,F)
=
∑
q0:N−1
Pr(Q
[0]
0:N−1 = q0:N−1)H
(
A
[0]
0:N−1
∣∣∣A[0]n ,W0, Q[0]0:N−1 = q0:N−1)
(i)
=
∑
q0:N−1
Pr(Q
[0]
0:N−1 = q0:N−1)
·H
(
W1:K−1 ·
[
G
(q0)
0|0 , G
(q1)
1|0 , . . . , G
(qN−1)
N−1|0
] ∣∣∣∣W1:K−1 ·G(qn)n|0 ,W0, Q[0]0:N−1 = q0:N−1
)
(j)
=
∑
q0:N−1
Pr(Q
[0]
0:N−1 = q0:N−1) ·H
(
W1:K−1 ·
[
G
(q0)
0|0 , G
(q1)
1|0 , . . . , G
(qN−1)
N−1|0
] ∣∣∣∣W1:K−1 ·G(qn)n|0
)
, (76)
where in (i) we have utilized the fact that the component functionsW0·G
(qn)
n|1:K−1 can be meaningfully
subtracted from the answers in the abelian group, and (j) is because W0 is now independent of
everything else after the corresponding component functions are eliminated in the answers, and the
dependence on q0:N−1 is fully absorbed in the answer function matrix G
q0:N−1
n . This implies that
for any set of queries Q
[0]
0:N−1 = q0:N−1 with a non-zero probability,
H
(
W1:K−1 ·
[
G
(q0)
0|0
, G
(q1)
1|0
, . . . , G
(qN−1)
N−1|0
] ∣∣∣∣W1:K−1 ·G(qn)n|0
)
= 0, n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}. (77)
This indeed implies thatW1:K−1 ·G
(qn)
n|0 can determine any W1:K−1 ·G
(qn′ )
n′|0 , for n, n
′ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N −
1}. Since the query can be other than for the message W0 (by taking a different permutation π(·)
in the lemma), it follows that the deterministic property P2 indeed holds.
Next consider (d), particularly for k = K−1 and the summand for n = N−1. For decomposable
codes, the inequality being equality implies that
0 = I
(
A
[K−1]
N−1 ;A
[K−1]
0:N−2
∣∣∣∣W0:K−2, Q[K−1]0:N−1 = q0:N−1
)
= I
(
WK−1 ·G
(qN−1)
N−1|0:K−2;WK−1 ·
[
G
(q0)
0|0:K−2, G
(q1)
1|0:K−2, . . . , G
(qN−2)
N−2|0:K−2
])
, (78)
which further implies the independence between the random variables WK−1 · G
(qN−1)
N−1|0:K−2 and
WK−1 ·
[
G
(q0)
0|0:K−2, G
(q0)
1|0:K−2, ·, G
(qN−2)
N−2|0:K−2
]
. Since in the above argument, we can choose any value
k in (d), and take any other order in the summation on both sides of (d), indeed the stated
independence property P3 holds. The proof is now complete.
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